Chronology | Current Month | Current Thread | Current Date |
[Year List] [Month List (current year)] | [Date Index] [Thread Index] | [Thread Prev] [Thread Next] | [Date Prev] [Date Next] |
Leigh,
Thanks for your thoughts. You raise more questions than you answer, but
that can be a healthy sign. Rather than going to your specifics, let me
now impose some of my thoughts on you, and let it rest.
I model neither energy nor charge as substances; they are calculated,
mathematical quantities - like scores that one tallies in a game. I have
exposed the pitfalls of energy reification in the past on this list.
However, I do find it useful to apply some of the properties of substances
to mathematical entities, either as metaphors or simply by recognizing a
commonly accepted widened use of certain words (institutionalized
metaphors?). For example, I find it more than a metaphor to apply the
ability to "flow" to any mathematical quantity which obeys the diffusion
equation. It is nigh impossible to express the content of that equation
without invoking a flow concept. This equation defines such a concept;
giving it the label "flow" does not thereby reify the flowing quantity, it
only gives us a useful visualization (we can only visualize substances,
not unattached properties).
"Velocity" is a sister word which certainly was also born as a property of
substances, but whose metaphorical applications have long since been
institutionalized in: "phase velocity", "group velocity", "cold front
velocity" etc. I do not count these latter phrases as metaphors; they are
now well defined, useful, technical terms and concepts with meanings of
their own, and do not of themselves invite unphysical conclusions (no
caloric spectre here; but there are pitfalls in eg., "moving
electrostatic fields", or - worse - the velocity of a thing relative to
an electrostatic field!).
As you say: "Physics holds no truths about Nature. The best we can do is
to construct our best descriptions of Nature . . ."
And the raw materials for this construction are derived from our sensory
perceptions of corporeal substances. In our model construction we have
learned to invent incorporeal, mathematical entities. We can
mathematically define the properties of these mathematical entities, but
in order to speak of them and visualize them we perforce (and always with
some risk) turn to the properties of corporeal substances. (1)